Book Review: The Control of American Foreign Relations by Borchard, Edwin
568 YALE LAW JOURNAL
In less definite and conscious form the question goes back into still earlier history.
To prove this thesis it is essential to show that this has been in truth "the central
problem of British imperialism from 164o to the present day"; that other dominions
and colonies besides the American have faced the same problem and met it in the
same way; and it would be of especial value to show to what extent, in the legis-
lative arrangements by which the present "Dominions" have become independent
units in the "British Commonwealth of Nations," this identical problem has been
solved. To this attempt the main part of the book has been devoted. The
economic, political and other causes of the American Revolution are disregarded,
and the discussion is confined strictly to the constitutional question and incidentally
to showing that the American leaders in their constitutional arguments were not
endeavoring to avoid or conceal the real issues but were honestly advocating their
side of an actual and most difficult problem of government. The only criticism
which the present reviewer has to pass upon the book is that it is too brief. There
are many places where the argument could have been developed in more detail not
merely to its own advantage but to the advantage of clearness, and it should be,
and can be, brought down to the present time by including more of the constitu-
tional history of the present dominions. The argument of Ireland for legislative
independence, as that was developed from the seventeenth century to the twentieth,
is most fully discussed and is perhaps more effective and telling than any other
could be because of the completeness of the parallel with the American argument.
It is enough by itself to be convincing. Professor McIlwain does not attempt to
show that the Irish arguments advanced before 1765 had any influence upon the
contents or form of the American arguments, though he is conscious that the
question may be raised. It is not necessary that he should show such a connection;
in fact evidence of borrowing by the Americans would weaken rather than
strengthen his case, which is strongest if similar conditions in different periods of
history and in different portions of the empire lead, without knowledge of historical
parallels, to similar constitutional claims. And enough is given to show that they
do this, whatever may be true of American borrowing of Irish arguments. Pro-
fessor McIlwain has certainly so far proved his case that it is no longer possible
to say without qualification that "the colonists would have lost their case if the




The Control of American Foreign Relations. By Quincy Wright. New York,
The Macmillan Company, 1922. pp. xxvi, 412.
This book constitutes the essay which won the Henry M. Phillips Prize in 1921
on the subject:
"The Control of the Foreign Relations of the United States; The Relative
Rights, Duties and Responsibilities of the President, of the Senate and the
House, and of the Judiciary, in Theory and Practice."
The essay deals with that part of our constitutional law which has to do with
the control of American foreign relations. The subject of the relation between
international law and municipal law is one of interest in all countries-an interest
promoted by the confusing and erroneous theories of analytical jurists, shared even
by our Supreme Court, that international law is binding only by consent; or that
the state's sovereignty can be limited only by its own consent. Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon, (1812) 7 Cranch, iI6. Cf. Wright, pp. 59, 159. Abroad, we have
such works as those of Triepel, Anzilotti and Diena which examine the problem of
the relation between international law and municipal law. For us, the subject has
a special interest due to our constitutional system, which, while vesting full control
over foreign relations in the federal Executive, sometimes in concurrence with a
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branch of Congress-though Congress itself has certain defined powers-neverthe-
less leaves the enforcement of many obligations to the states, states which escape
effective control by the Federal Government. The awkwardness of this defect has
occasionally embarrassed the National Government not a little. President Harding
did not help the solution of the problem when he unfortunately tied it up with the
Herrin labor riots of 1922, and thereby prevented any early chance of giving
federal courts jurisdiction when states fail to perform the nation's international
obligations.
Nor is Congress apparently especially concerned about the observance of our
treaty or other international obligations, throwing upon the Executive the duty of
squaring the international delinquency, if admitted. Nor is the House yet alto-
gether reconciled to the belief that the Executive and Senate can bind the nation
by any treaty requiring an appropriation. (See speech of Representative Theodore
E. Burton in the House, May i6, 1922.) Again, the question has occasionally been
raised whether a treaty can violate the Constitution.
These constitutional problems and anachronisms, among others, together with an
analysis of our well-known constitutional distribution of powers in dealing with
foreign affairs, are the subjects with which Mr. Wright, now professor of inter-
national law at the University of Chicago, is primarily concerned. He would
reconcile or avoid the conflicts and friction which occasionally arise among our
constitutional organs in these matters by adopting certain unwritten "constitutional
understandings," a term coined by Dicey to describe the peculiar constitutional
situation in England.
Mr. Wright suggests (pp. 370-37) that such "understandings" might develop
through:
"i. Declaration by Congress of 1ermanent policies, not in any way restricting
executive methods, but pointing the general ends toward which the President should
direct his effort;
2. Development by treaty of international organization and arbitration so as
to bring as large a portion of diplomacy as possible under the control of recognized
principles of international law . . . ;
3. Observance by the independent departments of government of the under-
standing that toleration, consideration, and respect should grace the exercise of
powers which may collide with the powers of other departments, which may need
supplementing by the action of other departments, or which may be indispensable
for the meeting of international responsibilities. Finally, as a necessary condition
of such observance;
4. Maintenance of close informal relations between the agencies of the govern-
ment having to do with foreign affairs."
How far these "understandings," by affirmative adoption, would prevent occa-
sional friction among governmental organs, is hard to say. To some extent they
are now practised. The fourth is undoubtedly useful; practice has already devel-
oped consultation, in advance of important action, between the Executive and the
Chairmen of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations. The Supreme Court, with its power of interpretation, has
also prevented the assertion of any conflict between a treaty or international law
and the Constitution. The recent treaty with Great Britain, though it permits the
bringing of liquor under seal within territorial waters, will hardly, it is believed,
be held unconstitutional. A more practical problem is involved in the effort to
reconcile concentration of power in the Executive, constitutionally and historically
accepted, with the desire for greater popular control of foreign relations. It may
require more than "constitutional understandings" to effect this object; indeed,
constitutional amendments are probably necessary. Not the least of these problems
arises out of the assumed authority of the President, without Congressional assent,
to use the armed forces of the United States abroad in the ostensible or actual
protection of the lives or property of American citizens. The mere statement that
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war is not thereby intended, does not alter the fact that the military occupation of
foreign territory without permission constitutes an act of war. With respect to
the Vera Cruz incident of 1914 (pp. 297, 299) it is now reported that in the pro-
posed protocol for the Mixed Claims Commission with Mexico, we may be held
liable in damages for the Presidential act of war in question.
A part of Mr. Wright's book has already become known to us through his valu-
able monograph on the "Enforcement of International Law through Municipal Law
in the United States"; other parts have been published in the form of periodical
articles. In the consideration of questions of foreign relations, in their constitu-
tional aspects in the United States, the book should prove very useful, particu-
larly as a summary of the precedents, with some critical comment, involving the




The Art of Cross-Exanination. By Francis L. Wellman. Second Edition. New
York, The Macmillan Company, 1923. pp. xiv, 371.
In his latest edition of The Art of Cross-examination, Mr. Wellman throws
aside the cloak of anonymity and writes of his own experiences in court in the
first person. This at once convinces the reader that "he speaks as one having
authority" that here is a work, not of a theorist, but of a practical trial lawyer.
The present work differs from the former editions chiefly in that the author has
disclosed additional matter from experience in his own practice and has augmented
his former work by examples of the skill of many present day successful practi-
tioners, such as John B. Stanchfield, DeLancey Nicoll, Max D. Steuer, Martin W.
Littleton, Samuel Untermeyer, Herbert C. Smyth and William Rand.
The public may find the work merely one of great interest; but the law student
who intends to engage in trial work will find the work not only a source of great
interest but a source of great profit. Of course it is not contended that the art of
cross-examination may be mastered by the reading of a text any more than it is
contended that a man, without artistic ability, may become a great painter from
reading about'the methods pursued by great masters of painting.
The examples of cross-examination set out by Mr. Wellman are both interesting
and instructive to a student of the law since they help him to visualize what actually
occurs in the trial of a law suit and show him how a clever cross-examiner may
break down a story which, at first blush, appears unassailable and thereby turn
apparent certain defeat into victory.
The chief value of the work from a law student's standpoint is that it abounds
in helpful suggestions of what to avoid as well as what to do. The first essential
of the good trial lawyer is a knowledge of when to cross-examine and when not to,
and if cross-examining, when to quit.
To the experienced trial lawyer the examples set forth showing the methods
employed by some successful practitioners, while interesting, would add little if
anything to the knowledge that he has acquired by his experience at the bar. But
even the most experienced trial lawyer might derive considerable profit from a
careful and thoughtful perusal of chapter II, "The Manner of Cross-examination!';
chapter V, "Cross-examination of Experts"; and especially chapter VIII, "Cross-
examination to the Fallacies of Testimony."
On the whole the work is one which is worthy of a place in the library of any
lawyer, and one of great value to anyone who intends to employ his capacities as
an advocate.
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